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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews policy developments in the EU transport sector. The EU has successfully introduced 
the external cost concept into policy thinking.  In the policy orientations, there has been too much 
emphasis on climate and energy objectives.  Also  modal share objectives are popular among policy 
makers but are not a good guideline for transport policies.  
The transition from high fuel taxes to distance charges has begun for trucks, but the charges need to be 
differentiated according to place and time. The same transition will also develop for cars, as soon as 
implementation costs have been reduced and public acceptance has improved.   
EU transport policy priorities can be to allow and promote the progressive substitution of high diesel 
and gasoline taxes by other car and truck user charges that depend on place and time, to scale back 
overambitious implementation of biofuel and electric car policies and re-orient resources to R&D for  
cleaner vehicles, to efficiently regulate distance charges for trucks and to assure an unbiased 
assessment of infrastructure investment needs. 
Member country priorities can be to move away from high vehicle ownership and fuel taxes to local 
congestion charges; the extra burden on motorists might be offset by scaling back vehicle excise taxes 
and to complement the introduction of road pricing with peak-load pricing for public transport. 
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0. Introduction  
This policy paper will concentrate on road transportation, and more specifically on the role of road transport 
pricing, taxation and regulation. Policies that focus on other transport modes and on competition policy issues will 
be discussed only occasionally. We also disregard largely endogenous location of activities, which is an important 
long term dimension of urban development  
We know from the analytical literature what reforms are most needed in the area of road pricing and taxation. 
These reforms require partially moving away from fuel and vehicle taxes towards car and truck user taxes that 
depend on place and time of use to more effectively mitigate congestion – often the most severe externality. 
Making this policy switch acceptable and implementing such pricing policies at the right policy level are the main 
policy challenges for the near future.  
A brief overview is as follows. In Section 1, we start by putting in perspective the different policy issues, the main 
external costs, the policy objectives and the main tax and regulatory instruments currently used. Moreover, we 
briefly review EU-policy developments over the last 20 years. The next sections focus on passenger transport 
(Section 2) and freight transport policies (Section 3), respectively. A final section concludes.  
 
1. Main policy issues and developments over the past 20 years  
The last 50 to 60 years (from the 1958 Treaty of Rome onwards), a process of EU-integration and enlargement 
from 6 member countries to the current 28 countries took place. For the transport sector, this integration has 
strongly increased the volume of both freight and passenger transport; road transport is by far the dominant 
mode. The integration has necessitated competition policies for the freight transport sector (for example, allow 
trucks to operate in all countries), some fuel tax harmonization for diesel and gasoline to curb tax competition
2
, 
and regulation of toll regimes to avoid overcharging of through traffic. Moreover, as transport equipment and 
services are important inputs in production, these two markets have been deregulated and opened up for 
competition, and they have been re-regulated to achieve EU-wide environmental objectives like climate change 
and air pollution.  
1.1. Transport activity and its external costs 
Table 1 puts the relative importance of different transport modes and their external costs in perspective. A brief 
overview of how these figures were calculated in given in Appendix. As already noted, road transport is still the 
dominant mode of transportation with a market share of some 75% for passengers and 72% for inland freight 
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 Although fuel tax floors imposed at the EU level through the Energy Tax Directive are generally not binding, 
economic theory and casual evidence suggest they increase tax rates even in countries where they are not binding 
(as countries react to a reduced risk of tax competition). See for example Parry and Vollebergh (this volume). 
transport
3
. Airplanes, cars and trucks use almost exclusively oil products and are the most carbon intensive 
activities in the transport sector.  
 
 
 Passengers (€ct/vkm for cars and buses and €ct/tkm or pkm for rail 
and air) 
Freight  (€ct/vkm for trucks and €ct/tkm for rail) 
 Urban (20%) Medium to long distance (80%) local Medium to long distance 
 
Cars (70%) Other (30%) Cars (80%) Rail, air (20%) Trucks (100%) Trucks (72%) 
Rail, ship, 
pipeline (28%) 
External 
climate cost 
0.8 
 
2.1 (bus) 0.5 
 
 
Air 
0.4€ct/pkm 
Rail 
0.1€ct/pkm 
 
1.5 
 
 
 
1.1  
 
 
 
 
 
External air 
pollution and 
noise cost 
4.3  21.4 (bus) 0.1  37.9 
 
2.0   
External 
accident cost 
0.3  0.1-0.2   1.1  0.8-1.2   
External 
marginal 
congestion 
cost 
0.6-242.6  1,2-576.3 
(bus)  
0-139.2   0-703.5  0-403.8   
Wear and tear 
infrastr. cost 
0.8 2.7 (bus) 0.2 0.2 €ct/tkm 
(rail) 
0-7.9 0-105.0 0.2 €ct/tkm 
(rail) 
Oil 
dependency 
x  x Air x x  
Economies of 
density  
 X  X    
Table 1. Relative importance of different modes and external cost estimates (All values are taken from the EU 
Handbook of External Cost (2014), except for climate damage; here a value of 25 Euro/ton was used – and there 
is a strong variation for all estimates). 
 
The figures reported in Table 1 imply a wide range of estimated external costs of transport in Europe. For 
passenger transport, we distinguish urban and medium plus long distance transport. In urban areas, the most 
important marginal external cost of car use is congestion, followed by climate change, other environmental 
externalities, and accident risks. Apart from the car, the main alternative urban transport modes are public rail and 
bus service. The major external cost of urban public transport is crowding among public transport users.
4
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 All data are based on the Statistical Handbook of the EU for 2014. 
4
 This is not represented in Table 1 
For medium to long distance transport, the externalities of car use are less important than in urban areas, as there 
is less population exposure to air pollution and less road congestion. The most important externalities are still 
congestion and climate change. As before, rail and bus are the main alternatives to car use. But for medium and 
long distance transport, it is well known that bus and rail service faces economies of density problems. Whenever 
demand is low, the low frequency that is offered makes the public transport modes unattractive. Additional users 
allows frequency to be increased, implying an external benefit for all existing users due to a smaller average 
waiting time at stops or more convenient service. Apart from yielding economies of density, additional users also 
allow public transport companies to benefit from economies of scale, lowering average costs per passenger 
kilometer. Finally, for long distance travel, high speed rail (HSR) and air transport are the most important 
alternatives to the car. In the EU, rail is mostly offered by the public sector, while air transport is privately offered. 
In terms of externalities, per passenger kilometer air is more carbon intensive than rail.  
Turning to freight transport, for short distances there is hardly an alternative for road transport. For medium to 
long distance freight movements, and depending on local circumstances, rail and inland waterways are the main 
alternatives. Both are slower, but they cause less external costs per ton kilometer.  
One of the main recent issues in EU transport policy is the large oil dependency of car transportation—oil use 
accounts for 90 percent of fuel used by cars.  In the EU (White Paper, 2013) this is considered to be problematic for 
two reasons. First,  there is an important import bill. Second, the sector becomes highly vulnerable to oil supply 
shocks. However, for economists who believe in the benefits of trade based on comparative advantage, a large 
import bill is not really an issue. The EU is already among those federations with the highest consumption taxes for 
oil products, and these can be seen as import taxes that alter the terms of trade. The import bill argument is 
therefore open to question. Furthermore, the oil shock and unreliability argument is also not an entirely 
convincing basis for decreasing oil dependency. Note that since 1973 the EU has not experienced a real rationing 
of oil supply (Kilian, 2008); in fact, price shocks were often generated by demand rather than supply shocks. 
Emergency stocks and growing non-OPEC supply (non-conventional oil from North America) further limit the risks 
of politically motivated supply interruptions.
5
  
 
1.2  Policy objectives and policy instruments  
The choice of policy instruments at the European level has to be seen historically as a gradual reform process, 
starting from purely national policy priorities, and ideally converging to an EU-wide optimum. The EU has defined 
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 For example, for the United States Brown and Huntington (2010) suggest that the costs (not taken into account 
by the private sector) arising from the vulnerability of the macro-economy to oil price volatility are not especially 
large.   
policy objectives and preferred policies in a series of Green and White Papers
6
. Over the past 20 years there has 
been a strong re-orientation of the objectives formulated. In the 1992 White Paper, the main focus was still on 
integrating the EU-economies by lowering transport costs and liberalizing the trucking industry. In 1995, a new 
focus came into play: next to regulation, transport pricing was suddenly considered as an important additional 
instrument. Transport taxes could be used not only to generate tax revenues but also to stimulate transport users 
to make better decisions regarding  transport mode,  the type of vehicle used, and when and where to make trips. 
Evidence was presented that “there is a significant mismatch between prices paid by individual transport users and 
the costs they cause – both in structure and in level” (Com(95)691 p i). For the first time, there was reference to 
the external costs of car and truck use, including congestion as an external cost, and there were references to 
solutions like road tolls in congested areas, differentiated fuel taxes to reflect differences in air emission rates 
between gasoline and diesel vehicles, etc.. That getting the prices right was now stated as an explicit  priority was 
de facto a revolution in the transport community, and the following White Papers turned the clock somewhat 
backwards. For example, the 2001 White Paper again put more emphasis on quantitative objectives (such as a 
specific minimum share of public transport) and on the financing of new infrastructure.  
From 2011 onwards, the reduction of carbon emissions and oil dependency and the promotion of renewables 
became additional focuses of EU transport policy. In the most recent white paper (Com(2013)17final), a European 
alternative fuel strategy (biofuels, electric vehicles) is presented. The main justifications for this strategy are oil 
import dependency, the deficit in the EU-trade balance (up to 2,5% of GDP), and the oil price hikes. These were 
“driven by speculation” according to the EU document and were estimated to cost 50 billion US dollar per year in 
additional import costs (Com(2013)17final). The idea was that the promotion of alternative fuels would boost 
growth in Europe. Moreover, they were considered necessary to reach the official EU wide objective of a 60% 
reduction of carbon emissions in 2050 (compared to 1990),  and they would help to reach the air quality 
objectives. 
Summarizing the main policy lines (see the 2011 and 2013 White Paper), we now have three main objectives 
- Resource efficiency (less carbon intensity, less oil dependency, electro-mobility).  
- A strong emphasis on promoting public transport for passengers (rail and bus in urban areas, and high 
speed rail for longer distances), and promoting rail and inland waterways for freight. 
- A European multimodal transport information, management and payment system. 
These policy objectives are often translated into quantity or market share objectives such as “50% of urban 
mobility should be carbon free in 2030”. Operationalization of the objectives is often achieved using regulations 
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 Different White papers were published: the 1992 White paper (market opening), the 2001 White Paper 
(‘‘European transport policy for 2010: time to decide’’), the 2006 White Paper (‘‘Keep Europe moving: a transport 
policy for sustainable mobility’’), the 2011 White paper (‘‘Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area. Towards 
a Competitive and Resource Efficient Transport System’’), and the 2013 White paper (“clean power for Transport: a 
European alternative fuels strategy”).  
and infrastructure subsidies at both the EU (for example, car emission standards) and member state levels (for 
example, subsidies for electric car refueling infrastructure).  
Table 2 presents the main instruments used for taxing and regulating road transport. The most important 
instruments currently used are still fuel taxes on cars (gasoline and diesel) and on trucks (diesel). For cars and light 
vans, fuel taxes are complemented by EU fuel efficiency standards imposed on deliveries of car manufacturers to 
EU customers and by lower member state taxes, or even subsidies, for other fuels (biofuels, natural gas, 
electricity). The fuel efficiency standards apply to the weighted average of new cars put on the market by each 
manufacturer. Despite the high subsidies, the share of other fuels is still very low: biofuels are blended with 
conventional motor fuels and their fuel share is less than 5%. The number of electric vehicles and natural gas 
vehicles makes up less than 1% of the new vehicle fleet. Returning to Table 2, most countries also tax vehicle 
purchases and ownership, but the tax formulas differ widely among countries.  Moreover, in almost all urban areas 
parking charges are used as an instrument to ration parking demand by non-locals and locals. Parking charges have 
progressively replaced permits, parking time restrictions and other regulations. They are currently not used to curb 
congestion, although they could be. Moreover, work-related parking is often subsidized. Finally, only a few cities 
(London, Stockholm, Milan) have implemented some limited form of road pricing in function of place and/or time 
of use. Motorway tolls have been used to finance motorway construction in some countries (historically France, 
Spain, Italy
7
).  
In those countries where there are no infrastructure tolls, taxes on truck trucks are complemented more and more 
by additional infrastructure payments in the form of daily or yearly passes (vignettes) that are unrelated to 
distance, or  by charges related to distance. The infrastructure charges are also a function of the infrastructure 
damage (by differentiation according to axle weight) and environmental parameters of trucks. In addition, all fuel 
purchases (including excises) for trucks and cars are subject to VAT; however, firms will not pay the VAT, as fuel is 
an intermediate input
8
.  
Quantitative policy objectives have the advantage of being easy to monitor, but they also have important 
disadvantages. First, the cost and benefits of reaching the objective are uncertain. Since Weitzman (1974), 
economists prefer price instruments, as they can better deal with uncertainty over future (e.g., energy and 
technology) costs. This is even more so when the EU-objectives are implemented country by country, where the 
costs of meeting these objectives can vary considerably across countries. 
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 Large toll roads are these days also found in Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland and Austria (ITF, 2013). 
8
 VAT-rates are not applied to all modes of transport. In several EU countries, there is no VAT on aviation, rail or 
public bus services.  
POLICY INSTRUMENT  CARS TRUCKS 
Gasoline excise Yes   
Diesel excise Yes 
Tax & subsidies for other fuels Lower tax (LPG) or subsidy 
(electricity)  
 
Vehicle purchase and ownership 
taxes 
In function of value, sometimes in 
function of CO2 emissions and often 
with a surcharge on diesel cars 
Eurovignette is fixed sum per year 
that is function of axle weight and 
Euro norm  
Parking charges In most cities  
Distance charging  No Germany, Austria, Poland, Slovenia, 
….  
Toll roads France, Italy, Spain , Portugal 
Road pricing by time of day and by 
place 
London, Stockholm, Milan, Goteborg No 
Fuel efficiency regulations  yes  small vans only 
Conventional emission regulations yes Yes 
 
Table 2. Main instruments used for taxing and regulating road transport  
 
Of course, in terms of policy instruments, the EU is limited to its domains of competence: climate policy, 
international transport and competition policies (vehicle and fuel standards, markets for public transport). Urban 
and regional policy issues like congestion and local public transport do not fall within EU competence.  
National and EU decision processes differ. National decision processes vary across member countries and usually 
involve a majority in Parliament; often, they also require a qualified majority over regions. These processes can be 
slow, but they seem to work. At the EU-level the procedure is more complex. First, for tax measures unanimity is 
required, while other measures require a qualified majority only. Second, initiatives are usually taken by the 
Commission, but they need to pass a double hurdle: the Council of Ministers and approval by the European 
Parliament. Finally, most regulations need to be implemented by the member states. Therefore, the process is 
lengthy and can be difficult. A famous example is the “Eurovignette” directive that regulates the charging of trucks. 
The initial proposal was made by the Commission in 1999, based on a Green paper of 1995. There was a demand 
by the European Parliament and the Council to have a better and more generic directive in 2006, and the new 
Eurovignette directive was only voted in 2011 (Weismann, 2013). It is therefore no surprise that many member 
countries took national initiatives to implement new charges for trucks before the final directive was voted upon.  
2. Evaluation of pricing and regulation policies for passenger transport  
We start this section with an appraisal of the current instruments used toward car transport. Then we look into the 
possibilities of using new pricing instruments for controlling car use. Finally, we briefly discuss policies that might 
complement the use of novel car pricing instruments. Specifically, we focus on pricing and supply of public 
transport, and we point at the relation between transport and labor market policies. 
2.1 Successes and failures of  the current instruments used  for car transport  
For car transport, most countries rely primarily on a combination of fuel taxes, vehicle purchase or ownership 
taxes and regulatory measures to achieve two main objectives: addressing external costs of car use, and raising tax 
revenues in an equitable way. Intra-country and international cross-border shopping limits the spatial variation of 
the gasoline and diesel tax. Moreover, this tax does not differentiate in terms of time of use. Hence, these 
instruments are poorly suited to addressing some of the external costs, especially congestion. But of course, there 
are many more ways to control externalities, and other policy instruments apart from fuel taxes could help. The 
most commonly used other instruments to control externalities are tax policies towards alternative fuels, purchase 
and ownership taxes on vehicles, and standards on vehicles (air pollution standards, fuel efficiency standards -- or 
equivalently CO2 emission rates -- and safety standards).  
In what follows, we consecutively deal with the gasoline tax, the taxation of fuels that substitute for gasoline 
(diesel, ..), taxes on vehicle purchases or annual ownership taxes, the regulation of car emission policies, and 
specific policies to stimulate the purchase of alternative fuel and electric vehicles. We do not discuss some other 
types of regulations such as specific safety regulations for road use (for example drunk driver penalties, speed 
regulations,..).  
The gasoline tax 
If countries use the gasoline tax as the main instrument to address all externalities of car use, the tax should be in 
line with the following expression, to which one can add a margin for revenue raising:
9
 
Fuel tax/liter = carbon damage/liter 
+ (marginal external congestion, accidents, air pollution costs per veh km)(km/liter)  
 
In this expression,  is the fraction of the fuel reduction from reduced vehicle use in response to the tax. As just 
mentioned, the externality component can be augmented by an additional margin to capture the revenue raising 
function of the tax.  
To understand the above expression, first note that the most straightforward element is the carbon damage, 
because there is a proportional relationship between carbon emissions and fuel use. We know carbon damage per 
ton should in principle be uniform over all sectors of the economy; based on recent estimates, in the EU it could be 
of the order of 20-25 Euro/ton of CO2 (this boils down to 0,06 euro per liter for gasoline and 0.07 euro per liter for 
diesel). Second, internalizing other externalities with a fuel tax requires a correction factor ( 1)   that takes 
into account the share of fuel reduction that is due to reduced driving rather than to more fuel efficient cars. As 
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 See Parry et al. (2014) for details and an application to many countries in the world. 
other externalities are related to distance rather than to fuel use, this component of the fuel tax wants to 
stimulate reduced driving rather than improvements in average fleet fuel efficiency. What complicates matters is 
that, whereas climate damage is independent of the location of the carbon emissions, the external cost of other 
externalities depends on location: accident externalities, congestion and air pollution all vary by time and place.  
Of course, a further complication is that there are many other ways to reduce such other externalities than 
through a reduction in total mileage: vehicles can be cleaner, safer, drivers can be more cautious, they can drive at 
other times and/or take other routes. Although the EU handbook on external costs is an important step forward 
there is, therefore, an obvious need to sharpen the external cost estimates, and to show how to apply them in 
more precise optimal tax formulas. There are two particular priorities. First, we need to know better what is the 
level of marginal congestion costs and how it reacts to vehicle volume in a network. Second, we need to have a 
better understanding of the conventional air pollution externalities, and we need to know what are the main 
differences between gasoline and diesel cars.  
 
Taxation of fuels that substitute for gasoline 
Before turning to the use of other instruments, it is instructive to study the taxation of fuels that substitute for 
gasoline. The most important substitutes are diesel, LNG, CNG, biofuels and electricity. There is no reason to apply 
a different taxation principle to substitutes of gasoline than to gasoline itself. Europe has a strong penetration of 
diesel cars, and this evolution is a matter of intensive debate. When we apply the same tax principle as above to 
diesel cars, there is clearly a need for a higher tax per liter on diesel than on gasoline. Although, of course, diesel 
and gasoline cars produce the same mileage-related externalities, there are two reasons for this. First, the carbon 
emission per car-kilometer is slightly lower, but other air pollution damage is higher for diesel than for gasoline; 
the net effect implies slightly higher external costs per kilometer for diesel. Second, the main reason why the 
diesel tax per liter should be higher is that a diesel car drives some 20% more kilometers with a liter of fuel than a 
gasoline car. Hence, to internalize the same mileage-related externalities, one needs a higher tax per liter on diesel 
Despite these simple principles, many EU-countries continue to tax diesel fuel at a lower rate than gasoline, where 
diesel advantage can be up to 50 cent/liter  compared to gasoline . Of course, diesel is also used by trucks so that 
diesel taxes are a compromise between car and truck use. In the case of cars, one can easily bring in other specific 
tax instruments for diesel cars (purchase or registration taxes) to correct for too low diesel fuel taxes
10
. But these 
are much less efficient second best taxes, as diesel fuel use by cars will still not be sufficiently taxed. Not 
surprisingly, the tax treatment of diesel implies that diesel cars have a large market share in many European 
countries (see Figure 1). 
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 Countries often ‘compensate’ the lower diesel tax by imposing higher annual vehicle and ownership taxes on 
diesel car owners. For a formal numerical simulation model analyzing the optimal taxation of diesel and gasoline 
car ownership and car use, see De Borger and Mayeres (2007).  
Finally, the same tax principle given above also holds for biofuels and electricity. However, for these fuels one can 
advance a learning by doing argument to justify a more favorable tax treatment until these vehicles have more 
substantial fleet penetration.  
 
 
Figure 1. The share of diesel in new car sales  in selected countries (2001-2012). Taken from the EU-vehicle 
market pocket book (ICCT, 2013). 
 
Vehicle purchase and ownership taxes 
Other instruments that have been used intensively are vehicle purchase and ownership taxes. Different member 
countries have been using these instruments for environmental and tax revenue objectives in widely different 
ways (for example, registration taxes often depend on CO2 characteristics, but they do so according to very 
different formulas). Moreover, there is a large variation in the level of these taxes. For example, although many 
(but not all) member countries have both a VAT on vehicle purchases, a registration tax and an annual vehicle tax, 
the level of the registration tax varies between zero and more than a 100% of the purchase price. 
In what follows, we illustrate the variety of car ownership policies by focusing on Denmark and the Netherlands— 
countries that have a tradition of high ownership taxes to cope with car externalities and that have recently 
fundamentally reformed their tax system. Both countries favored high purchase and registration tax policies to 
discourage car ownership, particularly of large cars. For example, in Denmark owners pay up to a 200% purchase 
tax on a car. Revenues from non-fuel taxes on cars were equal to 1.5% and 1.2% of GDP in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, respectively, compared with an average of 0.5% for the EU as a whole. To put this into perspective, 
fuel taxes represent some 1.4% of GDP, on average
11
. The efficiency and equity effects of these high non-use tax 
policies have not yet been analyzed very thoroughly. Considering equity, ownership taxes of course tend to 
discourage car ownership but, even if this tax is progressive in the value of the car, the net equity effects are not 
obvious. They depend, among others, on how ownership of different car types varies across the income 
distribution. As for efficiency, there is strong evidence that high purchase taxes on new taxes  may induce 
postponing car replacement, leading to rather old car fleets and high pollution. This was the case in the 
Netherlands and Denmark, until both countries recently reformed their purchase tax systems. High recurrent taxes 
on car ownership do not have this disadvantage.   
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 Taken from the EU-Transport Pocket Book 2013. The data are for 2011; they are labeled as “Environmental taxes 
as % of GDP – transport (non fuel)”.  
The wrong tax reform in Denmark 
First, consider the tax reform in Denmark; this consisted of moving from the existing system towards a strong 
feebate system. Munk-Nielsen (2014) documents how the reform, introduced in 2007, gave rise to a strong 
switch to more fuel efficient vehicles. To illustrate its implications, take as example a fuel efficiency 
improvement from 6.25 l/100 km to 5,25 l/100km. This gives a feebate of 1560 Euro or, using a mechanical 
calculation, a subsidy of the order of 1000 Euro/ ton of CO2. Based on a detailed modeling exercise, Munk-
Nielsen derives a more precise estimate of the cost of the system for the Danish car market as a whole, taking 
into account the rebound effect and the other external costs of driving. He arrives at a subsidy of 1545 Euro/ 
ton of CO2 saved. This makes the system very inefficient compared to CO2-saving efforts in other economic 
sectors (e.g., recent CO2 prices in the EU Emissions Trading System have been below <5??> euros per ton). In 
addition, the focus on CO2 reduction led to an increase on the share of diesel cars in the new car stock in 
Denmark from 5% to 40%. This is difficult to justify, given the higher air pollution damage of diesel cars. 
 
The Netherlands: another costly  tax reform  
From Table 1, we know that the external costs of a car are strongly related to car use and not to the ownership 
of a car, so there is a lot of room for tax reforms that substitute high purchase and ownership taxes by user 
taxes. The Netherlands has tried to use this opportunity in 2006 to transform the purchase and ownership taxes 
into road user taxes, a reform that did not go through (also see the next section). Instead, in the period 2006-
2010 the Dutch government changed the structure of the purchase tax from a tax based on the value of the car 
to a progressive CO2-tax. An example may illustrate the implications. Take the substitution of a 13,3 l/100km 
car by a car consuming 10 l/100km. This gives a reduction of the purchase tax of 12500 Euro and, using again a 
purely mechanical calculation
1
, it implies a saving of 5.2 ton of CO2. This leads to a cost of 2403 Euro/ton of 
CO2. Of course, for more fuel efficient vehicles the progressive tax will be smaller, but the cost is still of the 
order of 1000 Euro/ ton of CO2. Moreover, according to van Geilenkirchen et al. (2014), the net saving of CO2 
emissions is much smaller than previously indicated due to the rebound effect. Taking this into account, they 
estimate that the tax reform leads to CO2-savings of only 0.1% in the short run and 1% in the long run. The 
Dutch tax reform did avoid the promotion of diesel cars, but instead it strongly promoted the purchase of 
hybrid cars: in 2009, hybrid cars represented 4% of new car sales in the Netherlands, to be compared with a 
market share of less than 1% in the rest of the EU (ICCT, 2013). 
Besides Denmark and the Netherlands, several other countries, including France and Germany, have used a 
scrappage scheme in the period 2008-2010. The net effect on CO2 was low or even negative (D'Haultfoeuille et al., 
2013 ) and, if one does not account for the macro-economic stimulus, this program was costly.  
In view of the policies implemented in European countries, it comes as no surprise that CO2 emissions declined 
substantially over the past decades (see Figure 2). However, the above discussion makes clear that this reduction 
was achieved at a huge economic cost, and that more efficient policies (sticking to fuel taxes or more efforts in 
non-transport sectors) might have generated the same savings in emissions at much lower cost. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Average CO2 emission (test cycle) for new passenger cars (vertical axis) in several member countries 
(source IICT (2013))   
 
Regulation of air pollution and carbon  emissions 
One of the most effective additional instruments to control the environmental externalities of car use is the 
regulation of emissions of  traditional air pollutants. The Auto-oil program of the EU regulated the emissions of 
new cars and the quality of fuel. This regulation was efficient to tackle traditional pollutants in the sense that, by 
installing additional equipment at relatively low cost, emissions could be reduced by a factor 5 to 20 (Calthrop and  
Proost, 2003). The efficiency of the more recent and more stringent  emission standards for traditional air pollution 
is more controversial, and serious doubts remain on the efficiency of the regulation of air pollution by diesel cars. 
For example, the NOx standard of 2009 requires a maximum emission of 0.18 g/vehkm in the test cycle while the 
real emissions could be four times higher (ICCT, 2013). With more strict emission limits and increasing marginal 
abatement costs, it pays to fine tune the performance of the car specifically for the test cycle and to leave out of 
the test the engine load regimes that constitute real-world driving (e.g., uphill driving, acceleration on a ramp, or 
positive accelerations from a standstill). This results in an ever  larger difference between test cycle emissions and 
the real emissions. On the positive side, emissions rates maintained (at least partially) over vehicle life through 
periodic inspections programs.  
Fuel efficiency regulation for cars to reduce CO2 emissions is a more costly objective for several reasons. First, 
there is no technical measure like a catalytic converter or the use of fuels with a lower sulfur content that can 
reduce carbon emissions by a factor 5 to 20, as was the case for traditional air pollutants. Second, there is already 
an important carbon tax; it is called a gasoline tax. The gasoline tax (amounting to some 200 Euro/Ton of CO2)  is 
much higher than the carbon tax or the carbon abatement cost in other sectors of the economy (note that the 
price of tradable emission permits for CO2 varied between 5 and 30 Euro/ton of CO2). The simple reason is that 
the gasoline tax also serves to raise revenues and to internalize other externalities. For these reasons, too much 
fuel and CO2 saving is undesirable. We are already pushing very hard on CO2 reductions through high fuel taxes 
and (to varying degrees) vehicle taxes related to CO2 emissions—so additional incentives on top of these through 
CO2 per km regulations likely very costly. 
 
Figure 3 : Fuel economy performance, and planned and prospective fuel economy standards, selected countries 
(Source: ICCT, 2011) 
 
The standard case in favor of a fuel efficiency standard to reduce CO2 emissions is twofold. One argument often 
invoked by the EU is that of myopic consumers. However, the evidence to support the argument is mixed at best  . 
For example, Grigolon, Reynaert and Verboven (2014) show that, when EU consumers make car purchase 
decisions, they take into account close to 90% of the effect of fuel prices. Moreover, even if they would be myopic, 
jointly considering myopia and externalities imply that fuel efficiency standards could still be outperformed by fuel 
taxes (Parry, Evans and Oates, 2014).  
A second argument in favor of efficiency standards is that they require, for the same total CO2-savings, more 
technological progress than a tax instrument; this technology element spills over to the rest of the world (Barla 
and Proost, 2012, Dechezlepretre and Popp, 2014). The latter argument would be in line with the EU’s voluntary 
climate policy: the EU is indeed  a world leader in terms of fuel efficiency (see Figure 3). But if we want to have a 
successful transfer of technology, we may need to re-orient our technology standards towards less ambitious 
targets, as other countries have a less ambitious climate objective and do not want to pay for fancy super-efficient 
technologies (Eliasson and Proost, 2014). Finally, does the world really benefit from the EU’s efforts to make diesel 
cars much more fuel efficient?  
 
Alternative fuels and electric vehicles 
As part of the EU climate and energy policy, there was a directive pushing for the use of biofuels (bio-ethanol and 
bio-diesel made from biomass) and the promotion of electro-mobility. The most successful country in introducing 
biofuel cars was Sweden, where a subsidy program increased the market share (in new car sales) of flexible fuel 
cars from 8% in 2006 to 22% in 2008 (ICCT, 2008). Huse (2014) analysed the Swedish Green Car Rebate in great 
detail. This program gave a subsidy of 1300 to 1500 Euro for the purchase of a medium size flexible fuel car, a car 
that could run on gasoline and on biofuel (ethanol) or other less CO2 intensive fuels
12
. In addition, the program 
was more lenient for the fuel efficiency of flexible fuel cars. As it is easy and cheap to turn a standard car into a 
flexible fuel car, the consequence was that suppliers offered very quickly flexible fuel car variants, but in a less fuel 
efficient version
13
. Consumers could arbitrage between gasoline and biofuels and, when oil prices dropped, ended 
up using a lot of gasoline. The final result was an expensive subsidy program, achieving a high share of flexible fuel 
cars, but with a low environmental effectiveness. Similarly, it would be no surprise that the current stimulus for 
electro-mobility is, with present technologies, also not a very cost-effective option to reduce carbon emissions (see 
Christ, 2012).  
It is useful to turn to the implications of fuel efficiency  standards and subsidy programs for more fuel efficient cars 
for the manufacturers. As they are bound by an average standard on the sales of new cars in Europe, any incentive 
by one country to impose more fuel efficient cars implies that a manufacturer can afford to sell less fuel efficient 
cars in other countries. Two other particularities of the fuel standard are worth mentioning. The first is that the 
average fuel efficiency does not take into account the expected mileage; this gives a too large weight to electric 
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 Huse (2014) reports an emission reduction of 45% when gasoline is replaced by ethanol from sugarcane 
production. Of course, there are many other environmental issues associated to the production and use of biofuels 
than CO2 emissions; these are not discussed here.  
13
 This happened to be often large, home-produced Volvo’s. 
vehicles, as these are typically used for short trips. The second issue is that there is a widening gap between the 
theoretical measurement of fuel consumption defined in the standard and effective fuel consumption. The ICCT 
(2013) reports an additional real world consumption of fuel that was of the order of 7% in 2001, but it has 
increased to 20%-25% in 2011, the reason is again the fine tuning of performance for a specific test cycle.  . So the 
way the current standard is formulated is less and less realistic. 
Summing up 
Summarizing, the main instruments used by the EU to tackle externalities are high fuel taxes and fuel efficiency 
standards; here it has been a forerunner compared to other parts of the world. High fuel taxes have been a second 
best instrument to correct several externalities at the same time. The stringent fuel efficiency standard has been 
eroding the effectiveness of the high fuel tax. Some member states, overestimating the benefits of gasoline 
savings, have launched very costly subsidy programs for even more fuel efficiency, or to promote the use of 
alternative fuels. Promotion of alternative fuel vehicles may benefit from technical compatibility standards (as 
argued by Vollebergh and van der Werf (2014)), because these allow network effects and reduce costs. But the EU 
has imposed costly minimum market shares and is lagging behind in agreeing on technical compatibility standards. 
 
2.2 Acceptability of new instruments for pricing cars. 
We discuss consecutively urban congestion pricing,  low emission zones, parking and paying for motorway use. 
Urban congestion pricing 
For a long time, all big cities tried ‘standard’ instruments, such as offering cheap and extensive public transport 
services and charging high prices for parking, in their effort to reduce externalities. These instruments did have 
some effects, but they failed to solve congestion problems; moreover, they were expensive
14
. Singapore was the 
first city to implement some form of congestion pricing. Now many cities in the EU are potentially interested in 
new price instruments to curb congestion, but very few also implement them. Cities that did introduce new pricing 
instruments include London (2003), Stockholm (2007) and Milan (2012); Goteborg introduced it in 2014 but the 
system was voted down later
15
. London has implemented zonal pricing; Stockholm and Milan implemented cordon 
tolls with prices varying by the time of day. In a cordon pricing system, road users pay only when entering the 
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 A few papers made a systematic (but very simplified) comparison of the relative welfare gain of different 
instruments to address externalities in a city.  Proost and Van Dender (2001) find that public transport optimization 
as the only instrument can achieve only some 30% of the maximum welfare gains that could achieved by  a 
combination of pricing of cars and public transport. Basso and Silva (2014) find similar results for London; for 
Santiago de Chile, where busses are the dominant transport mode, they find, not surprisingly, that a policy 
focusing on reserved bus lanes is as good as road pricing. For non-urban transport, De Borger and Mayeres (2007) 
illustrate the huge welfare loss of using pricing instruments that are not time-differentiated.  
15
 The Goteborg toll was not accepted by the public in a referendum. It was nevertheless accepted by the local 
parliament, mainly because it allowed to benefit from national investment funds that match the toll revenues.  
zone, but trips within the zone are free. In zonal pricing systems, one also pays for trips within a given zone. Many 
more cities were tempted and quite a few organized referenda about the issue, but they never implemented the 
new instrument. Although the EU seems to be the world leader in the implementation of some form of road 
pricing, the question remains why only a few cities took the final step. This may seem surprising, because careful 
analysis of the experience in the different cities shows that the implementation of these road pricing measures 
have been welfare improving, provided that the revenue has been used productively (see Anas and Lindsey 
(2012)). 
Several lessons can be drawn from the available experience. First, the design of road pricing systems is very 
important for the net welfare effect. For example, Stockholm was more efficient than London, because the system 
had lower transaction costsand more finely differentiated charges
16
. Second, a striking feature is that only a small 
share (25%) of the suppressed car trips switched to public transport; the rest of the trips disappeared due to more 
car sharing, combining trips, or simply foregoing the trip. A third conclusion from the analysis of the experience in 
London (Transport for London) and in Stockholm (Eliasson et al. (2009)) is that more people were in favor of the 
road pricing system after it was introduced (ex post) than before its implementation (ex ante).  
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 Transaction costs consist of the pure administration costs of a payment scheme (ranging from 10 to 50% of total 
revenues) and of the effort and time costs for users that are associated to the payment. The administration costs 
of a payment scheme consist for an important part of enforcement costs (identifying number plates of cars, 
checking whether they paid or not, sending invoices…). There may be an important learning effect here. 
The political economy of road pricing 
De Borger and Proost (2012) analyze the political economy of road pricing, using a model of policy reform. Road 
users have an initial majority, but they are uncertain about the individual costs of switching from  car use to 
public transport, or to foregoing the trip altogether. They show that this uncertainty implies a high expected 
substitution cost, and that it is likely to lead to a negative expected benefit for initial car drivers. Assuming that 
non-drivers also share in the collected toll revenues, car drivers perceive high expected substitution costs and 
low revenue from toll charges before introduction of road pricing, because they have to share toll revenues with 
non-drivers. After implementation, uncertainty is resolved and the decisive car user (being close to the median) 
will see lower substitution costs, and may vote in favor ex post.  The results is that a majority may vote against 
road pricing ex ante, although a majority would have been in favor after its introduction. The analysis further 
shows that fewer voters are against road pricing when toll revenues are used to subsidize public transport than 
when they are redistributed to all voters. Moreover, if the total number of peak trips is price inelastic, one way 
to limit the toll level and still obtain the same total welfare gain is to subsidize public transport, as it is mainly the 
net price difference between road use and public transport that drives the modal shift. In addition, this strategy 
prevents that revenues are shared with those that do not travel. The results of the paper are consistent with a 
number of recent empirical observations on efforts to introduce road pricing, including the systematic rejection 
of road pricing in referenda, the more favorable attitudes towards road pricing after than before its introduction, 
and tying the toll revenues to support public transport. 
 
In sum, there have been several successful road pricing experiences in EU-cities over the last 10 years. It is 
expected that more will follow soon, and that this will be an important policy development for the next decade. 
There are two important questions for this development, besides toll rates and time differentiation. First, what is 
the best form this road pricing should take: cordon pricing around the city or zonal pricing? This will depend on the 
geography of the city and the distribution of trips. Second, is the introduction of new  instruments best organized 
as a bottom-up or as a top-down process? Top-down initiatives (“national road pricing”) at the level of the federal 
government were discussed in the Netherlands and in the UK, but they were not accepted. The top-down  schemes 
can avoid that one region exploits its local monopoly power by overcharging trips by non-residents. However, the 
disadvantage of top-down schemes is their lack of flexibility to adapt to changes in local circumstances. Moreover, 
acceptability is more difficult because federally imposed differentiated pricing runs the risk of regional 
discrimination
17
. The schemes that were implemented (London, Stockholm, Milan) are all bottom-up. The risk of 
monopoly pricing in local schemes can be overcome by constraining the use of the revenues
18
 
19
. Of course one 
could also construct a dual system involving elements of congestion charging by both national and sub-national 
governments (note that the present combination of fuel taxes and parking charges is also a dual system).  
Low Emission Zones 
Closely related to road pricing is the proliferation of Low Emission Zones in Europe. The EU directive makes cities 
and regions responsible for implementing sufficient measures to reach the urban air quality guidelines. A large 
number of cities (for example, more than 40 in Germany alone, as well as Milan) took this air quality directive 
seriously (although enforcement is weak or non-existing) and implemented a variety of measures to comply with 
the objectives. These measures consisted in either banning the most polluting cars or enhancing public transport 
supply. According to Perry and Wolff (2011), the banning of polluting cars was effective and welfare-improving, 
while the extension of public transport supply was not. De Borger and Proost (2013) have studied low emission 
zones and various other externality-reducing measures in an urban environment (for example, traffic lights, speed 
bumps, bypass roads, etc.). They show how the initiatives taken by cities can very well lead to inefficient policies: 
too many traffic lights and speed bumps will be placed, and insufficient investment in ring-roads are good 
examples of poor local policies.  
Parking 
Cities have long been using parking charges. High parking charges can be a second best measure to curb excessive 
car use in cities. Economists have been slow in picking up this instrument, but it has its function. Contrary to road 
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 In the Netherlands, there was a political majority for transforming the high fixed car charges into smarter user 
charges, but one of the reasons the majority broke down is the regional differentiation of the charges.  
18
 In London, the revenues served mainly to finance public transport. In Stockholm, the toll revenues are used for additional 
road infrastructure in the region. In Goteborg, the toll revenues are used for a new rail tunnel under the city. 
19 See De Borger and Proost (2013) for a theoretical comparison of the two schemes and an analysis of the constraints on 
federal and local schemes that can improve the outcome.  
 
pricing, this instrument is widely accepted. New technological developments and better modelling can increase its 
efficiency. Of course, efficient parking pricing has to be place and time dependent. The technology to implement 
such systems is available. For example, in part of San Francisco there is electronic monitoring of parking 
occupancy, and prices are adjusted regularly to achieve a given occupancy rate (say 90%). 
Paying for motorway use 
Several countries have installed tolling systems to pay for their motorway infrastructure. The tolls have been used 
mainly to generate revenues, but some motorways start to implement time- and place-dependent tolls. Those 
countries that have not yet implemented tolling systems on their motorways are now tempted to also charge 
foreign cars by using vignettes. Switzerland was the first to do so, and other countries will follow; for example, 
Germany plans introducing a vignette per day, month or year in 2016. These vignette systems can be differentiated 
by type of car (as in the clean car zones in Germany), but they are not differentiated by distance, by time and by 
place of driving. The main function of these vignettes is therefore to make foreign users pay for the local 
infrastructure, because domestic car owners are often compensated by an equivalent reduction of local car taxes. 
Of course, such vignettes are relatively poor instruments to tackle congestion.  
Summing up  
In the longer term, we need higher transport prices in congested urban areas, and possible lower prices in rural 
areas. This means that the function of gasoline taxes, managed by central government, will be eroded slowly by 
higher congestion charges and by parking charges that will most likely be set by local governments. The 
implications of this ongoing evolution for tax levels, environment, infrastructure funding and intergovernmental 
transfers are still to be studied.   
2.3 Complementary public transport policies  
In dense EU metropolitan areas, public transport has a high market share that can be well over 50% of passenger-
kilometers. But in many cities this comes at a high cost, as cost recovery is low (often below 50% of the operation 
costs). Parry and Small (2009) find that high operating subsidies for public transport in large cities (they studied 
London, Los Angeles, and Washington DC) can be justified on the basis of second-best arguments. Subsidies allow 
exploitation of scale economies due to increased frequency (which reduces waiting times at stops), higher route 
density (reducing average user cost of accessing the system) and increased load factors (reducing average 
operating cost). But the most important justification for the high subsidy  is that 50% of the extra public transit 
trips attracted by the higher subsidy reflects trips that would have otherwise been made by car. In practice, 
however, many cities have implemented high public transport subsidies but, unfortunately, only a small share of 
the extra demand came from former car users
20
. The result has been an important congestion problem in public 
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 There is good evidence for Stockholm where the cross-price elasticity for bus is rather low, about 0.1 
(M.Borjesson, Fung, Proost, 2015).   Van Goeverden et al. (2006) report results on the introduction of free busses 
transport in some cities. With a cost recovery of less than 50%, funding additional capacity is difficult. In addition, 
most cities do not yet differentiate their public transport fares in function of time of day and place in the network. 
Even without implementing road pricing for cars, it seems that many cities could benefit from an increase of public 
transport fares in the peak period (for an illustration for Paris, see Kilani, Proost and Van der Loo, 2014).  
Public transport can not only be made more attractive by lower prices, but also by improved quality. This requires 
investments in trams, metros and high speed rail (HSR). Some countries do have a tradition of high quality public 
assessment (including the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and France), but in many other countries such investments 
have not been assessed by a traditional Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA). It turns out that many large transport projects 
are not justified according to traditional CBA-methods. For urban transport, there seems to be a systematic 
preference for expensive trams, which is quite likely unjustified (see Tirachini, Hensher and Jara-Diaz, 2010). For 
medium to long distance transport, some high speed rail projects are difficult to justify. Several of the projects on 
the Trans European Network priority list that were eligible for additional EU-funding also have a poor social rate of 
return (Proost et al., 2013). This illustrates the importance of detailed ex ante evaluation of large-scale investment 
projects. In this respect, it is encouraging to note that there has been recent progress in assessment techniques 
that better take into account agglomeration economies and regional effects (see Teulings, Ossokina and De Groot, 
2014). 
What are appropriate public transport policies depends on whether or not new pricing instruments for passenger 
cars are introduced. For example, the introduction of road pricing makes differentiated (in space and time) public 
transport fares more desirable (with higher peak fares). Moreover, the benefits of public transport investment 
depend on which car pricing instruments are introduced.    
 
2.4 Complementary labor market policies  
Although detailed analysis of such policies are outside the scope of this paper, some countries have developed 
labor market policies that have strong – and sometimes very adverse – implications for the transport sector.  
One example is the large implicit subsidy many European countries provide to company cars (see Guttierez and 
Van Ommeren, 2011; De Borger and Wuyts, 2011). This is illustrated  in Figure 4 (Harding, 2014) where the 
proportion of the taxed benefits of a company car is reported for OECD countries. In many EU member countries 
less than 50% of the (private) benefits of a company car is taxed.  Although high labor taxes are probably the main 
reason for their existence, subsidies for company cars are often defended on the basis of their presumed 
environmental benefits. Company cars are on average more fuel efficient than the average car in the stock, 
because they are much younger than the average car and benefit often from specific fuel efficiency standards. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in Hasselt (a town in Flanders) and found that some 15% of the new bus users would have used the car when 
public transport was not free.  
However, the subsidies are well known to raise car traffic, mainly (but not exclusively) for commuting purposes, 
and they distort car ownership decisions. Moreover, the environmental benefits are highly doubtful, as the 
increase in kilometers compensates for the lower emissions per kilometer and as there are already covered by 
other environmental policies in place (Copenhagen Economics (2010)). The estimated welfare cost of subsidies to 
company cars is therefore large, and a drastic reduction of the implicit subsidy has been suggested to raise 
efficiency of the transport sector (see the references given above).  
Another related example is the tax deductibility of commuting expenses in many EU-countries. This deductibility 
can be justified under some conditions once new pricing instruments (road pricing) are introduced, but they 
reduce welfare at current taxes on car use (Van Dender (2003), De Borger (2009)).   
 
 
Figure 4. Share of the benefits of a company car that is fixed in 2012 (source: Harding, 2014) 
 
3. Pricing of trucks  
In this section, we turn to pricing policies for road freight transport.  The share of trucks in freight transport has 
been growing over the years to 72%, while the rail share has been decreasing slowly to 17% in 2012
21
, while the 
share of rail has been slowly decreasing. There are two developments we want to highlight. First, the way trucks 
are charged is changing fast in the EU; second, the EU is pursuing a vigorous policy to decrease the modal share of 
road freight transport. 
3.1 From fuel taxes to distance charges  
Almost all EU countries charge excises for diesel fuel used by trucks. Because trucks can cover 1000 to 2000 
kilometer with a single tank, countries or regions engage in fuel tax competition. The difference in distances 
covered implies that tax competition is much more important for trucks than for cars. Evers, de Mooij and 
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 Inland freight activity by mode (source: EU , 2014)  
Vollebergh (2004) studied a panel data set for 17 countries (1978-2001) and estimated how countries react to the 
diesel excise taxes set in neighbouring countries. They found strong evidence of tax competition: when 
neighbouring countries increase their fuel excise tax by 10%, an average EU-country increases its tax by 2 to 3%. 
Within the EU, some smaller countries chose a strategy of low excise taxes to make international hauliers fuel up in 
their country; Luxemburg is the most obvious example. This behavior has brought the EU to negotiate a minimum 
level of excise taxes. In 2012, Germany charged an excise of 0,589 $/liter, while Luxemburg charged the EU-
minimum of 0,343 $/liter (IEA, 2013). Evers et al. (2004) further also found that the imposition of minimum tax 
rates has increased overall excise levels, but it has not decreased the intensity of tax competition. Next to diesel 
excise taxes, EU member states that did not use tolls on their motorways, were allowed to charge additional fees 
for road use in the form of a vignette (annual, monthly, daily fixed payment per vehicle). This Euro-vignette had to 
be non-discriminatory, and it was to be based on the actual infrastructure costs
22
 (see Vierth and Schleusser, 
2012). Over time its use was extended so that it can also charge for environmental costs.  
Technological progress in charging techniques implied that several countries facing through traffic wanted to 
introduce distance-based charging. Switzerland (not an EU member) replaced its vignette system in 2001 by a 
kilometer charge that charged trucks much more than before. The neighbouring countries followed: Austria (a 
transit country parallel to Switzerland) in 2004, Germany in 2005 (although it wanted to start earlier), the Czech 
Republic in 2007, Slovakia in 2010 and Poland in 2011. Other countries (for example, Belgium) are preparing 
distance charges too. Some other EU countries had already a tolling system for most of their motorways (France, 
Italy, Spain). This mainly serves to cover infrastructure costs, with the restriction in France that an un-tolled 
alternative (viz., national roads) has to be available.   
The different charging systems in place for trucks in Europe (see Figure 5 for the situation in 2012) show a clear 
pattern,  in that the introduction of distance charges were geographically strongly correlated. The member states 
in the center of Europe tend to use distance-based charges, while states further from the center use vignettes or 
no charges at all (apart from fuel taxes). This is no surprise, because countries still engage in tax competition and 
react to the introduction of higher kilometer charges in neighbouring countries (De Borger, Proost and Van Dender 
(2005)).  
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 See directive 1999/62/EC followed by directives 2006/38/EC and 206/103/EC. 
 Figure 5. Different types of truck pricing in EU (source: EC.)  
 
There are four interesting features to note about the transition from vignettes to distance-based charges. First, all 
distance-based charging generated a lot more revenues than the vignettes they replaced. In Germany, distance 
charge revenues were 6.5 times larger than the revenues of the Eurovignette (Vierth and Schleusser, 2012). One of 
the reasons the vignette revenues lagged behind was that it is a system common to five countries, and  unanimity 
is required for updates to capture inflation and to include environmental costs. Second, the distance charging 
schemes discriminate much more in function of conventional air pollution than do the Eurovignette systems. Third, 
as noted in the theoretical literature, kilometer charges imply the risk of tax exporting to foreign users (see Kanbur 
and Keen (1993), De Borger, Proost and Van Dender (2005)).  
  
 
Figure 6. Total charges in Euro for a standard domestic haul of 400 km by a 40 ton truck. Charging policy as 
of 2012 (data taken from ITF, 2013 – regrouped by Mandell and Proost (2015)) 
If one compares the distance charges between countries, one finds that Switserland charges 10 times more per 
kilometer than most other EU-countries. Austria also charges significantly more than the others. Of course, 
although infrastructure costs may be higher in these countries, the main reason is the strategic position of 
Switzerland as a transit country. Austria is also a transit country but it is a slightly less interesting route, and it is 
bounded by the EU cap on truck charges, while Switserland is not. Finally, note that the transaction costs 
associated with a distance-based system vary between 10 and 20% of the revenues (see Hamilton and Eliasson, 
2013), probably much larger than those for fuel excise taxation.  
Figure 6 gives the total charges and taxes for a standard domestic haul in several OECD countries. The charges have 
increased strongly over the last 10 years.  The countries with the lowest charges are those countries that have no 
tolls or distance charges
23
 . 
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 Ireland (high fixed charges per truck) and UK (high fuel charges) are the exceptions.  
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The EU has to some extent anticipated that the introduction of distance charges in transit countries may lead to 
charges that are too high. The EU constitution does not allow discriminatory charges, but this is no guarantee 
against too high truck charges in transit countries. It therefore requires that distance charges for trucks have to be 
based on external costs, but the estimation of external costs requires a lot of interpretation. For this reason, the 
distance charges are capped by the EU on the basis of average infrastructure costs. When road congestion is an 
important external cost, and one has constant returns to scale in infrastructure extension, this cap can guarantee 
efficient pricing. This is due to the combination of two mechanisms. First, when tolls equal the marginal external 
congestion costs, they will pay for road infrastructure costs in the presence of constant returns to scale in road 
capacity. The second mechanism is that a government that wants to maximize the benefits for its local users and 
cannot discriminate against foreigners, will implement the federally optimal policy. Adding the obligation to spend 
the toll revenues on road infrastructure forces the local government to implement optimal policies. So thereis 
even no need anymore for the federal regulator to know the external congestion costs (Van der Loo and Proost, 
2013).  
The transition from fuel taxes to kilometer-based charges. 
 Mandell and Proost (2015) analyse this transition and find that distance charges are very contagious, but that 
the replacement of diesel taxes by distance charges is not necessarily welfare improving. The outcome will 
depend on the availability of additional instruments to tax diesel cars and on whether or not the distance 
charges are finely tuned to external costs.   
Consider first the case where diesel excises are used only for trucks, while cars are taxed using other 
instruments. In the Nash equilibrium, the diesel taxes can then be lower or higher than the external and 
infrastructure costs of trucks. The taxes will typically be low in countries of equal size with intensive tax 
competition. When countries differ in size, a low tax results in the small country, confirming results from the 
literature (Kanbur and Keen, 1993). It is found that when distance charges also become available and their 
implementation costs are low, then all countries will adopt distance charges for trucks, and fuel taxes are 
driven to the bottom. The distance charges will all be higher than the external cost. One expects this to be the 
case, for example, when there is tolling on a serial corridor used by international traffic and where several 
governments tax traffic within their jurisdiction. As long as the different governments do not fully incorporate 
the consumer surplus of international traffic, tolls will be larger than the external cost (De Borger, Dunkerley 
and Proost, 2007)
1
. Moving from diesel taxes to distance charges can therefore be welfare-decreasing. 
Consider next the case where fuel taxes are used to tax not only trucks but also to tax diesel cars. If there are 
no distance charges, the fuel tax will have to balance the optimal taxation of diesel cars and trucks. As only 
one instrument is used, the tax will be a weighted average of external costs of diesel cars, trucks and margins 
on international trucking. Tax competition can again increase or decrease the tax, but diesel use by cars is 
typically less vulnerable to tax competition. The result will be that the diesel tax in one country reacts less 
strongly to tax changes in a neighbouring country. Introduce now distance charges for trucks. Both countries 
will use distance charges and fuel excises. The sum of distance charges and fuel excises will be higher than the 
external cost for trucks, and the diesel tax tends to be lower than the external costs of diesel cars. Again there 
is no guarantee that the introduction of distance charges improves the welfare effects of pricing. 
 
Finally, note that the distance charges for trucks have up to now mainly be used as a simple distance toll with some 
environmental differentiation. They can become much more effective when they are more closely geared to the 
external costs of congestion, local air pollution and accidents.  
3.2 Complementary policies   
The EU policy line for freight contains ambitious modal share objectives. This requires additional investments but 
also better integration of international rail freight operations. Progress on the integration of rail freight operations 
(interoperability, etc.) has been slow. As observed before, many of the investment projects that were considered a 
priority did not pass the CBA test (Proost et al, 2013).  
The introduction of more competition in rail freight services by the vertical divestiture between infrastructure and 
operations has been slow as well, despite the fact that the expected welfare benefits from increased competition 
are likely to outweigh the extra transaction costs. The latter are estimated to amount to just 2-3% of total costs 
(Merkert, Smith and Nash (2012)).  
4. Conclusion  
The EU has succeeded in making member states accept external costs as a basis for transport tax policies. As the 
available policy instrument set was up to now mainly restricted to fuel taxes and fixed taxes for vehicle ownership, 
suboptimal policy developments were the result. There has been a too large emphasis on climate issues leading to 
a strong focus on fuel saving and on development of alternative fuels. These have eroded the fuel tax base and the 
effectiveness of fuel taxes to address road traffic externalities, particularly congestion.  
With the rising congestion pressures on urban roads and public transport systems, Europe needs a fiscal reform in 
the transport sector. The reform consists in replacing, to a large extent,  the fuel tax instrument by a set of 
distance taxes that vary by place, time and type of vehicle. New, potentially better instruments are being 
introduced for trucks under the form of distance charging and for cars under the form of congestion charging. 
Distance charging for trucks is at present mainly geared to revenue and environmental objectives and is therefore 
lacking the right focus. Congestion charging for cars has the correct emphasis on  congestion but needs to work on 
its public acceptance and on its transaction costs. Dealing with congestion will be necessary if one wants cities to 
continue to be the engine of economic growth.  
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APPENDIX TO TABLE 1 
 
Unless otherwise noted, all external cost information is based on the EU Handbook on External Costs of Transport 
(2014). 
 
External climate cost (Tables 35, 36, 38 in the Handbook) 
A CO2 damage cost of 25 euro per ton was used instead of the 90 euro per ton (based on avoidance costs) of the 
EU Handbook. The former estimate is more in line with the cost of reducing CO2 in other sectors of the economy. 
The category “urban”  of the Handbook corresponds to “urban” and “local” in Table 1, while the categories “rural” 
and “motorways” in the Handbook are classified as “medium to long distance” in Table 1. The values of climate 
costs for type Euro-5 vehicles (cars, trucks) of medium size are shown in the table. For air transport, the values for 
medium flight distance (1000-1500km) are used. 
 
External air pollution and noise cost (Tables 17, 20, 28 in the Handbook) 
The calculation method focuses on the monetary valuation of the explicit impact that the emissions have on 
human health, environment, and economic activity. The effect of emissions is constructed taking into account 
diffusion, dose-effect relationships as well as valuation of statistical years of life lost and health impacts. The values 
are obtained by adding the air pollution and noise cost. We use the values of Euro-6 and medium-sized vehicles 
(cars, buses, trucks) in our table. Using the bottom-up approach, the noise costs vary greatly according to time of 
day and density of traffic. We take the upper bound of noise costs, which are the noise costs of thin traffic at night, 
taken from the 2008 version of the Handbook updated for the change in overall price levels in the EU. 
Again, the category “urban” in the Handbook corresponds to “urban” and “local” in our Table 1, while the 
categories “rural”, “suburban” and “motorways” in the Handbook are classified as “medium to long distance” in 
our Table 1.  
 
External accident cost (Table 12 in the Handbook) 
External accident costs are those social costs of traffic accidents, which are not covered by risk oriented insurance 
premiums. Therefore, the level of external costs depends on the level of accidents and on the insurance system 
(on whether there is experience rating or not, and on what is covered by insurance). The most important accident 
cost categories are medical costs, production losses, material damages, administrative costs, and the so called risk 
value as a proxy to estimate pain, grief and suffering caused by traffic accidents in monetary values. Mainly the 
latter is not covered properly by the private insurance systems. The values are corrected for underreporting of the 
number of injuries in some EU countries.  
The categories “car” and “HGV” in the Handbook correspond to “car” and “trucks” in our Table 1 respectively. 
“Motorway” and “other non-urban roads” are classified as “medium to long distance” in our Table 1. 
 
External marginal congestion cost (Table 9 in the Handbook) 
The external cost is the additional cost imposed by a user of the road network on all other users of the road 
network. The EU handbook estimates of congestion costs are derived from the UK estimates based on the 
aggregated approach of the FORGE model, using nominal GDP per capita and the average exchange rate between 
euro and the British Pound for 2010. The FORGE model distinguishes several congestion bands based on the 
volume to capacity ratio, but no EU data on the traffic shares in each bands are available. So instead of averages 
across congestion bands or road and area type, we give ranges of the external congestion costs. 
The categories “urban- main roads, other roads” and “metropolitan- main roads, other roads” in the Handbook 
correspond to “urban” in our Table 1, while the categories “rural” and “metropolitan- motorways” in the 
Handbook are classified as “medium to long distance” in our Table 1.  
 
Wear and tear infrastructure cost (Tables 48 and 51 in the Handbook) 
Marginal road infrastructure costs correspond to the increase in road maintenance and repair expenditures that 
are induced by higher traffic levels. Heavier vehicles tend to cause more damage to the roads, whereby the degree 
to which an increase in weight leads to higher damage follows a power law.  
The categories “other trunk roads” and “other roads” in the Handbook correspond to “urban” in our Table 1, while 
the category “motorways” in the Handbook is classified as “medium to long distance” in our Table 1. 
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